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Rónán Ó Fathaigh 
 
Following the Mosley v. the United Kingdom judgment delivered by the Fourth Section of the 
European Court some time ago, it would seem appropriate to highlight a very surprising 
judgment delivered by the Third Section recently which held that there had been a violation of 
Article 8 where the Romanian courts had acquitted a broadcaster in criminal defamation and 
insult proceedings concerning statements made in a press release.  
 
The applicant in Sipoş v. Romania was a television presenter with the Romanian public 
broadcaster SRTV. Following her replacement as a presenter, the applicant made a number of 
statements to the press alleging that the public broadcaster was engaged in censorship. The 
broadcaster responded by issuing a press release, explaining that the presenter had been replaced 
due to audience numbers. However, the press release also made reference to the applicant’s 
emotional state due to family problems, questioned her discernment and suggested she was a 
victim of political manipulation.  
 
The applicant initiated criminal proceedings for defamation and insult against the director of the 
public broadcaster. The broadcaster argued that it was merely responding to the allegations of 
censorship. The Romanian courts acquitted the defendants of defamation and insult, holding that 
there was no intention to defame or insult, and the defendants had acted in good faith.  
 
The applicant made an application to the European Court claiming that the Romanian courts, by 
acquitting the defendant broadcaster, had failed in their positive obligations under Article 8 to 
adequately protect her right to reputation  
 
The Third Section framed the question before it as whether the domestic authorities had struck a 
fair balance between the right to reputation and freedom of expression, and noted that positive 
obligations under Article 8 come into play whenever statements could affect the reputation of a 
person beyond the limits of acceptable criticism.  
 
The Court first noted the context of the issue: it recognised that the press release was in response 
to the allegation of censorship being restored at the broadcaster. It also noted that the press 
release was not written spontaneously, but by a specialised department of the broadcaster.  
 
In relation to the specific statements in the press release, the Court considered that the claim of 
being a victim of political manipulation was devoid of any factual basis. It also considered that 
the claim regarding her emotional state was based on private elements of the applicant’s life, and 
such a disclosure did not seem necessary to the Court.  
 
Finally, the Court noted that given the chilling effect of criminal sanctions, a civil action would 
have been it more appropriate. However, the Court nonetheless concluded that the statements 
had crossed the acceptable limit, and the Romanian courts had failed to strike a fair balance 
between protecting the right to reputation and freedom of expression. Thus, there had been a 
violation of Article 8, and the applicant was awarded 3000 EUR in damages.  
Comment 
 
It is worth pausing to consider this judgment: the Romanian courts acquit a broadcaster for 
criminal defamation and insult, holding that the crucial elements of the offence were not made 
out, namely intention or mala fides. Yet, the Third Section comes along, engages in a total 
reassessment of the facts, disregards the intention requirement, and holds that an acquittal does 
not adequately protect the right to reputation. This coupled with the fact that a civil action could 
have been initiated by the applicant. In light of this holding, criticism would seem warranted on a 
number of grounds: 
 
Firstly, and most strikingly, is the apparent ease with which the Third Section thought it 
acceptable to interfere with the decisions of the domestic courts: it held that because the 
statements went beyond the “acceptable limit” (“limite acceptable”, para. 38), there had been a 
violation of Article 8. It must be asked whether it is legitimate for the Court to assess statements 
according to some amorphous test such as “acceptable criticism”. This would seem a 
questionable approach for the Court to take, as it would seem to be an arbitrary threshold, with 
the Court providing no guidance whatsoever as to what such a threshold entails.  
 
This approach contrasts sharply with the approach of the Fourth Section in the recent case of 
Kasabova v. Bulgaria, where it considered that it would only interfere with the determination of 
domestic courts where it was “manifestly unreasonable”, this being quite a high standard. 
Moreover, the Third Section fails to engage with the long standing principle that the European 
Court is exercising a supervisory function, and is not to take the place of the national authorities 
but rather to review their decisions under Article 8, in light of the case as a whole (Fressoz and 
Roire v. France, Grand Chamber, para. 45). 
 
Secondly, the Court only makes passing reference to the margin of appreciation; it neglects to 
properly discuss this principle. It is worth noting that the Grand Chamber has held that the choice 
of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of relation between individuals is 
in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting States’ margin of application (Odièvre v. 
France, Grand Chamber, para. 46), with the Court acknowledging the wide margin of 
appreciation in such circumstances in Armonienė v. Lithuania (para. 38).  
 
Thirdly, and most surprisingly, the Court recognises that criminal sanctions have a chilling effect 
on speech, citing Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, and further recognises that it would have 
been more appropriate to initiate civil proceedings available to the applicant. Cumpănă and 
Mazăre was a seminal Grand Chamber judgment not likely ignored, yet the Third Section passed 
over the chilling effect consideration without explanation. This would seem questionable, and it 
is also worth noting that the Court has stated that domestic courts must take into account the 
likely impact of their rulings not only on the individual cases before them but also on the media 
in general (Kasabova, para. 55; ). Such a principle is equally applicable to the European Court, 
and the judgment in Sipoş sends a strange signal to domestic courts in relation to criminal 
sanctions.      
 
Finally, it would seem curious that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is 
urging the decriminalisation of defamation and insult (see Resolutions 1123 and 1577), and yet 
the Third Section of the Court is holding that a failure to secure a criminal conviction for such 
offences violates the (unenumerated) right to reputation, in circumstances where a civil remedy 
is available.  
 
This judgment may be easily dismissed as irrelevant, and with no broader consequence; 
however, it is precisely such a judgment - with its lack of enunciation of basic principles, sparse 
reasoning (nine short paragraphs), and absolute dearth of case law citation (five judgments) - 
which certain sections of the Court will draw upon to continually develop the unenumerated 
“right” to reputation in a terribly unprincipled fashion.  
 
